Abstract-Illegal memory accesses are a serious security vulnerability that have been exploited on numerous occasions. In this letter, we present Gandalf, a compiler assisted hardware extension for the OpenRISC processor that thwarts all forms of memory-based attacks. We associate lightweight capabilities to all program variables, which are checked at run time by the hardware. Gandalf is transparent to the user and does not require significant OS modifications. Moreover, it achieves locality and incurs minimal overheads in the hardware. We demonstrate these features with a customized Linux kernel executing SPEC2006 benchmarks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to demonstrate a complete solution for hardware-based memory protection schemes for embedded platforms.
I. INTRODUCTION

W
ITH the advent of Internet of Things (IoT), the number of low-resource embedded devices deployed is likely to increase exponentially. The security of these systems is of growing concern because of the diverse cyber-physical applications that will be controlled by these devices. In the absence of robust security environments, vulnerabilities introduced due to programming flaws is highly likely to be exploited. These vulnerabilities provide a means by which an attacker can subvert program execution in order to execute a malicious payload.
Several of the vulnerabilities originate due to illegal use of memory. For instance, a program execution can be subverted by overflowing a buffer on the program stack to modify the return address of a function [1] . Although memory-based vulnerabilities have been known for over 30 years, they still rank amongst the top 25 vulnerabilities in system software [2] . They have been used to develop a variety of malware leading to privilege escalation, denial-of-service, network penetration, and malfunction of applications. Over the years, several countermeasures have evolved to thwart memory-based attacks. Some of these countermeasures, like [3] and [4] , create sandboxes to protect sensitive data from leakage, while others like [5] - [8] , prevent malware from executing by verifying the validity of each memory access. Sandboxing mechanisms often require considerable hardware modifications and are not always suited for embedded and IoT devices. Prevention mechanisms use metadata to perform memory access validity checks. Works such as [5] - [7] , which rely solely on compiler modifications to perform validity checks, often have considerable performance overheads. This has resulted in techniques that off-load the pointer validity checking to the hardware.
Most hardware-based solutions [9] , [10] associate metadata corresponding to each pointer used in the application. The metadata specifies the base and bound addresses for a pointer (ptr). At runtime, each memory load or store that uses the pointer, is permitted only if ((base ≤ ptr) ∧ (ptr < bound)). This pointer centric approach, however, suffers from two major drawbacks. First, there may be multiple pointers referencing a single memory object. Each of these pointers would require their own copy of metadata resulting in considerable overheads. Further, it would take significant effort to invalidate the metadata of all pointers every time the associated memory object is freed. Contemporary works like [9] and [10] have overcome these issues by maintaining the metadata of all pointers in a separate table stored in memory. Each memory access would look up the table to obtain the base and bound. While this approach solves the problems associated with multiple pointers, the separate table would break locality thus incurring performance overheads. Further, additional caching would be needed to accelerate access to these tables.
In this letter, we present Gandalf, where the base and bound metadata is associated with every stack-based memory object rather than the pointer as shown in Fig. 1 . The base and bounds define the perimeter of the object. Each load and store involving the object is first validated by the object's perimeter and only then allowed to complete. If a load or a store fails this check (e.g., access to ptr + 18 in Fig. 1) , then an illegal instruction exception is sent to the program, thereby terminating it.
Similar to [9] and [10] , Gandalf overcomes the drawbacks of naïve pointer centric approaches. However, unlike these works, we do not use an explicit table to maintain metadata, hence we do not suffer from the drawbacks associated with [9] and [10] . It may be noted that such object centric approaches have been developed in software before as shown in [6] . However, to the best of our knowledge, 1943-0663 c 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. Program stack layout when using Gandalf. We associate each memory object on the stack with a base and bound metadata. The pointer ptr can only access the buffer var2 because its capabilities are set by the base and bound of var2. Any attempt to read or write to a location beyond var2 will result in an exception.
Gandalf is the first object-based approach implemented in hardware.
We have implemented a prototype of Gandalf by extending the OpenRISC (https://openrisc.io/) architecture. We have also developed an LLVM pass for Gandalf to provide software support. The setup is implemented on a field-programmable gate array (FPGA). It boots Linux and permits Gandalf enabled applications to co-exist with native Linux applications. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that prototypes an end-to-end system with memory protections, OS and compiler support, without resorting to any simulators.
While the object centric memory protection approach and the complete end-to-end prototype are the main contributions of this letter, Gandalf has several other features.
1) It is completely transparent to the users. The only requirement is to activate the pass at compile time with the --gandalf command line option. 2) In the hardware, we reuse existing special registers and instructions of the OpenRISC architecture and thus do not extend the ISA. This also results in compatibility of non-Gandalf code in the new hardware. 3) Gandalf is light weight. The impact of the hardware changes on the critical path delay is around 2% and the area overhead around 6%. The structure of this letter is as follows. Section II gives an overview of our proposed scheme. The implementation of our solution is detailed in Section III. The security arguments supporting our scheme is presented in Section IV. The results and overheads are presented in Section V and the conclusions are presented in Section VI.
II. HIGH LEVEL OVERVIEW OF GANDALF
We present an abstract overview of our implementation at the compiler, OS, and the hardware level. In order to enable memory protection, we enable the Gandalf option during program compilation. During the compilation every named variable in the program is augmented with metadata that specifies its legal boundaries. Named variables in the program can be of three types, namely: 1) scalar variables; 2) arrays; and 3) pointers. For bounds checking in pointers, the compiler uses the metadata of the object it is dereferencing rather than the pointer's own metadata. At runtime, all load and store instructions using these variables are routed through the Gandalf hardware (Fig. 2) . The hardware will perform bound checks (based on the corresponding metadata) if it determines that Gandalf is enabled (i.e., GE = 1) and the load/store operation is not special (i.e., MDWE = 0). Special loads/stores, indicated by a set metadata write enable (MDWE) bit, are used to fill the metadata. If a protected variable tries to access a memory location outside its bounds, Gandalf triggers an exception causing the program to terminate.
Programmers can choose to enable or disable Gandalf for every object file using a compile time option. Thus a single program, comprising of multiple object files, could have some functions that are Gandalf enabled and others that are not. The compiler ensures that function calls and memory accesses work seamlessly between the protected and the unprotected domains. However, we only guarantee protection for pointers that are in the Gandalf enabled domains. Gandalf also permits protected and unprotected processes to simultaneously co-exist in a system. This requires operating system modifications that save and restore the Gandalf context during context switches.
III. GANDALF ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe the implementation of the three important components of Gandalf. The first component is the compiler plugin, called Gandalf pass, which is invoked during compilation to infer and attach metadata (base and bounds) to program variables. The second component, called Gandalf hardware, is a hardware component that checks for out-of-bound memory accesses at runtime. The Gandalf context isolator is a kernel patch that permits Gandalf enabled processes to co-exist with native (non-Gandalf) ones in a system. Fig. 3 shows the Gandalf architecture.
A. Gandalf Pass
Gandalf pass is an LLVM compiler pass which, when enabled, provides the necessary information to the hardware enabling bounds checking. It also instruments code so that Gandalf and non-Gandalf functions can seamlessly interact and execute. In this section, we describe the various functions of the pass in more detail.
1) Metadata Allocation and Population:
For every named variable in the program, the pass creates two additional fields for storing base and bound metadata. These fields are created at offsets −4 and −8 bytes with respect to the variable. The pass then inserts two store instructions that populate these fields with appropriate values. A sample stack enabled with Gandalf protection is shown in Fig. 1 . It must be noted that the metadata population is also performed through store instructions. Such store instructions must skip memory protections checks since they work on metadata. Gandalf pass achieves this by enabling a bit in the system register called the MDWE right before issuing the metadata stores. The current version of the pass provides a single base and bound for aggregate data-structures like structs. In the future, we plan to provide fine grained base and bound metadata for elements within the structures.
2) Base and Bound Checking: In order to aid the hardware in identifying the metadata easily, we use an internal register called the metadata base register (MDBR) that stores the metadata address. The compiler pass prepends every load and store instruction with instructions that populate the MDBR. We instrumented the compiler with the appropriate data structures to achieve this. Fig. 4 shows an example of an instrumented code generated by the modified compiler describing the MDBR population.
3) Switching Between Gandalf and Non-Gandalf Domains: To ensure that Gandalf enabled functions seamlessly execute along with non-Gandalf functions, the compiler pass enables Gandalf (GE = 1) at the start of every function of the module and disables it (GE = 0) at the end of the function. This ensures that when an unprotected function calls a protected function, the protection checks are done only in the protected function and vice-versa.
B. Gandalf Hardware
When a load or a store instruction is executed by the processor, the execute stage of the pipeline performs protection checks before issuing the memory access request. To perform the checks, the execute unit uses the state machine described in Fig. 5 . It first gets the base value by issuing a memory read to the address pointed by the MDBR. It then obtains the bound value by issuing a memory read to the address pointed by MDBR+4. The data access, i.e., the actual load or store, is allowed to proceed if and only if it is within the specified base and bounds. Otherwise, a protection violation exception is triggered by the hardware. In our design, we reuse the loadstore unit (LSU) for performing the base and bound memory reads that are described in Fig. 5 . Executing these protection checks may take multiple clock cycles to complete. We therefore add additional control logic to stall the processor pipeline until the protection checks are completed.
We implemented Gandalf by modifying a 6-stage single issue version of the OpenRISC processor called mor1kx cappuccino (https://openrisc.io/). The in-order processor has a tightly coupled cache, an MMU unit, 32 general purpose registers and 11 groups of special purpose registers. In order to implement the two control bits (GE and MDWE), we use the zeroth and first bits of an unused special purpose register. We use another unused special purpose register for the MDBR.
C. Gandalf Context Isolator
The Gandalf state comprises of the bits GE and MDWE and the MDBR register. We modify the OS to preserve the Gandalf state whenever there is a context switch. This is needed to permit Gandalf enabled programs to co-exist with nonprotected programs. For the Linux kernel, we modified the functions start_thread and __switch_to in arch/openrisc/kernel/process.c to save the state of these bits on a per-process basis.
IV. SECURITY ARGUMENTS The base and bound metadata associated with named variables in the program prevents the attacker from performing illegal memory operations. In this section, we argue that in a Gandalf enabled system, an attacker will not be able to subvert these protection checks.
1) Disabling Gandalf: The attacker can disable Gandalf by resetting the GE and the MDWE bits. This is possible only if the attacker writes to the special purpose register using a malicious payload. However, the malicious payload cannot be leveraged by the attacker without overflowing a buffer; which Gandalf prevents by design. 2) Manipulating Metadata: The attacker may also try to modify the metadata to subvert the Gandalf checks by using another pointer. However, this requires the pointer to overflow, thereby violating its base and bound checks, which Gandalf detects. Assuming that all pointers in the program are protected with Gandalf, access to metadata remains out of scope. 3) Pointing to Spurious Metadata: The attacker can attempt to mimic base and bound metadata by using some dummy data inside valid limits of a buffer. However, this requires a load to the MDBR register with the address of the dummy base. This cannot be done because it requires an mtspr instruction to be executed and the attacker does not have the capability to modify the program binary.
V. RESULTS Gandalf requires modifications to be made in the hardware, OS, and compiler. We implemented the framework by extending an OpenRISC processor. The Linux kernel 4.4.0 was customized to execute on the processor. The entire setup runs on a Cyclone-4 FPGA board (EP4CE22F17C6N) having a Terasic de0-nano FPGA. We tested the correctness of the implementation by running several exploit codes. 1 Our implementation is able to successfully prevent all the exploits from 1 https://github.com/nekt/csaw_esc_2016/tree/master/tools/exploits getting triggered. We were also able to run few of the SPEC 2006 benchmarks with minimal modifications. Table I compares the overheads of our scheme with two contemporary works. It may be noted that Gandalf is the only scheme that provides end-to-end support for memory protection. The work in [10] does not have OS and compiler support, while [9] provides results on a simulated hardware. Our results show that Gandalf incurs relatively less overheads both in hardware and software. The entire OpenRISC processor with the Gandalf extensions utilizes 11,491 LUTs with a clock frequency of 55 MHz. The runtime overhead of software applications was found to be higher compared to [9] . However, unlike [9] we have not implemented any compiler level optimizations. There is scope to reduce the overheads of Gandalf by employing similar optimizations in our compiler pass.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we present a hardware-software co-design to mitigate memory attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that associates base and bound metadata with memory objects rather than pointers. We demonstrate how this could reduce overheads considerably, leading to light-weight and robust memory protection schemes. We have prototyped the end-to-end solution by incorporating the proposed techniques in the compiler, OS, and hardware. The resulting solution has the least overheads compared to other state-of-the-art works.
While Gandalf works well for preventing stack-based spatial attacks, observing its effectiveness on temporal attacks such as use-after-free and attacks on heaps would be an interesting future direction. Further, we would like to optimize the compiler to potentially alleviate the high runtime overheads.
